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Part One: Introduction 
In September 2005, the State of Israel completed a unilateral withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip.  Israel, which had acquired the Gaza Strip (as well as the Sinai Peninsula, 
West Bank, and Golan Heights) as a result of the 1967 Six-Day War, changed its policy 
with regard to the Palestinians and acted on its own, without consultation with the 
Palestinians.  The unilateral disengagement involved withdrawing all of Israel’s civilian 
population from the Gaza Strip as well as all Israeli military presence.  Israel closed off 
the Gaza Strip and its 1,482,405 Palestinian residents (CIA World Factbook).  The plan 
was initially anticipated to be the basis for a final unilateral withdrawal from the West 
Bank, and imposed a final set of terms resulting in establishing a Palestinian state.  The 
Israelis intended to dictate the terms of the final status agreement without any 
negotiations with the Palestinians, this was known as Ehud Olmert’s “convergence plan.”  
However, due to unforeseen events, this plan would be abandoned.   Regardless, the 
Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip was accomplished and represents a unique 
case of unilateral action by the Israelis in the Middle East peace process.   
After the first Palestinian intifada (uprising), which started in 1987, the Arab 
States realized that they could no longer represent the Palestinian people.  The beginning 
of a formal relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians occurred at the Madrid 
Peace Conference, on October 30, 1991, when for the first time the Israelis sat down at 
the same table with the Palestinians, along with the Syrians, Lebanese, and Jordanians, 
with the United States serving as a mediator.  This conference would eventually lead to 
the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.  This started the era of multilateral negotiations 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians when they were able to consistently meet and 
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work on a “final status agreement” between Israel and a future Palestinian state 
(Friedman xiv-xv). 
Following the collapse of the peace process at the end of 2000 and beginning of 
2001, the Israelis and the Palestinians entered into a new type of relationship.  This was a 
“hybrid” policy, because there were no actual negotiations, but there were attempts at a 
peace process along with Israeli unilateral actions.  This period included the second 
intifada and Israel’s building of the separation barrier between Israel and the Palestinians 
in and around the West Bank. Israel altered its policy on April 14, 2004, when Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon announced his intention to President Bush that Israel would 
withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip (Jewish Virtual Library).  This represented a 
major change in Israeli policy and for the first time would result in serious actions 
towards the creation of a Palestinian state without negotiations with the Palestinians. 
The Gaza withdrawal actually met certain requirements of previously proposed 
solution to the conflict.  All Israeli settlers and soldiers were removed from a territory 
designated in every seen agreement to become part of the Palestinian state.  Negotiations 
had absolutely no impact on this action in the slightest.  Immediately it must be asked 
what have been the effects of such a dramatic change in policy, the unilateral withdrawal, 
on the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians and on the future of the peace 
process.  
The unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip was a unique action because 
nothing similar to it had been done in this conflict.  The shift in policy to unilateral action 
would therefore have consequences that were unknown when the plan was enacted.  This 
thesis seeks to discover how this change in strategy to unilateralism affected the region.  
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Was the action beneficial, detrimental, or has it had no effect on the Palestinian- Israeli 
conflict?   
In this context the conflict is referring to violence and the willingness to 
participate in violence.  Since the disengagement was accomplished by the Israelis it is 
therefore important to see what impact the policy change has had on the Palestinians.  
David Makovsky, director of the Project on Middle East Peace Process at the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, says “Gaza disengagement will be the prism through which 
to view future peacemaking.” (Makovsky- Gaza Pullout) His statement rings true that this 
complete change in strategy will serve as an important benchmark to which future actions 
could and would be compared.  If the unilateral actions had a positive impact on the 
Palestinians towards the creation of peace and stability, then it could provide an answer 
to the conflict.  However, the effects of this shift in policy must first be fully examined. 
Close to two years after the withdrawal, it is impossible to know exactly how the 
Israeli unilateral disengagement will ultimately affect the relationship between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians.   However, we are able to analyze the immediate impact the 
policy shift had on the Palestinian people in the short run.   The first and most obvious 
way to measure this impact is by seeing whether and how the policy change impacted 
Palestinian violence towards Israelis. This is the key variable to be examined, because the 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was in part designed to reduce violence towards Israelis. 
It is now possible to study the immediate impact on Palestinian violence towards Israelis.  
It is also possible to examine how Palestinian use of and support for violence against 
Israel has changed throughout the years and different types of Israeli policy.  This is 
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important in showing whether the violence is due to a shift in the thinking of the 
Palestinian people and also if it is connected to the current Israeli policy.. 
Roadmap: 
 The second part of this thesis will focus on why the question regarding the 
unilateral disengagement’s effects on Palestinian violence is important.  It will look at 
why the Gaza withdrawal and its effects will impact the future relations between the 
Palestinians and Israelis.  This section will also examine the past relations between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis and show why the shift to unilateralism was significant.  This 
part will also incorporate a detailed explanation of the way the research was conducted.  
The third part of this paper will present the evidence, in which the dependent variables 
measured are Palestinian violence and the inclination of violence against Israel.  The 
independent variable being examined as the explanation of violence is the policy change 
by Israel to the unilateral withdrawal.  This is done through examining both Palestinian 
public opinion polling collected between 1994 and 2006 and with a count of violent 
attacks against Israel during the “hybrid” policy years and the years during the shift to 
and implantation of unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip, from 2003- 2006.  The 
fourth and final part will draw conclusions by combining the public opinion polling with 
the violence count.  This part will also include policy recommendations on the future of 
the Palestinian- Israeli negotiations. 
 
Part 2:  Relations between the Israelis and Palestinians on a continuum 
 In the history of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians it has been 
very hard to determine who, if anyone, is in control of the situation.  Before 1993, there 
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was no official recognition by either Israel or the Palestinians of the other side’s right to 
exist as a state.  Starting with the signing of the “The Declaration of Principles on Interim 
Self-Government Arrangements” (Oslo 1), the Israelis and the Palestinians were able to 
start an actual relationship, which included dialogue (Bickerton and Klausner 264-266).   
It is hard to define completely what the actual relationship was between the two sides.  
For example whether one side was coercing the other more so then the other or even 
whether only one country was completely dictating the terms.  Rather, the relationship 
between Israel and the Palestinians can be assessed on a continuum that contains all of 
the possible relationships.  On one extreme end of this continuum is when both countries 
are mutually negotiating and have equal say and impact.  At the other end would be when 
one side, in this case Israel, has complete control over the situation, and forces the 
Palestinians into whatever outcome they choose.  Included in this continuum is when one 
country tries to coerce the other into doing something for them.  It is in this continuum 
that the different multilateral negotiations and unilateralism fit into context, each closer to 
the separate ends. 
 The concept of the Israeli unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip (also 
known as a pullout or withdrawal) refers to a plan by Ariel Sharon that included the 
evacuation from the Gaza Strip of all Israeli military and civilian personnel, including all 
Israeli civilian settlers who lived in the Gaza Strip and the dismantling of every Israeli 
military base inside the Strip.  The Gaza withdrawal was designed and accomplished by 
the Israeli Government with no help from or coordination with the Palestinian people.  
Therefore, this is considered to be a unilateral withdrawal.  For the purposes of this paper, 
unilateralism will be defined as any action that is accomplished by one party acting on its 
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own terms without negotiations or contact with the other party.  Multilateralism is when 
there are negotiations and agreements between the two parties done in an environment 
that allows for equal input. This will be referred to as multilateralism and not 
bilateralism, because there are often other parties involved in the negotiations and 
contact, typically the United States or another international party.  Mediated unilateral 
action may also involve a third party.  For example, to some extent the Gaza Withdrawal 
was mediated, because the United States supported the disengagement financially and at 
the same time it was thought to have been a part of the “Roadmap” to peace (a plan 
designed by the U.S., Russia, European Union, and the United Nations, that will be 
discussed later) (Performance-based Roadmap).  However, because the Palestinians were 
not involved in the slightest in the Gaza withdrawal and it was done by the Israelis on 
their own terms, it is considered here to be a fully unilateral action. Therefore, In the 
2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip Israel was forcing their own terms on the 
Palestinians, by dictating the provisions of the withdrawal. 
The problems that prevent any solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict: 
The Palestinians and Israel face several issues important to creating a lasting 
peace process between the two nations.  The failure to reach a consensus agreement on 
any of these important issues led to the current withdrawal from Gaza.  The most 
important part of a final status agreement is for both countries to acknowledge and 
recognize the right for the other party to exist as a separate nation state in its own 
territory with defined and secure borders.  There are four major areas of dispute that must 
be resolved in order to create a permanent and final agreement.  The first major problem 
to solve in any agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians is the establishment of 
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agreed upon borders between the two countries and what relationship these borders 
would have to the 1949 armistice lines.  Included in this problem is also how to connect 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip into one country, while keeping both Israel and a future 
Palestinian state contiguous.  
The second major problem, the Israeli Settlements, is automatically connected to 
the problem of borders.  There are currently over 250,000 settlers in the West Bank, and 
all of these people want to be included in land that will be annexed into the state of Israel.   
The third major problem are the Palestinian refugees who either left or were 
forced out of Israel during the 1948 war and now inhabit either the current Palestinian 
territories or other countries.  The Israelis are unwilling to accept any agreement that 
results in the allowance of these refugees to move to Israel, because it would endanger 
Israel being a Jewish state.  This problem, also known as the right of return, is considered 
by some Middle East experts as the most complicated issue and is one of the hardest to 
solve.    
The fourth and last major area of dispute is the status of Jerusalem, the claimed 
capital of both peoples.  This is also considered by many experts to be the hardest issue to 
solve, because of its unique complexity.  Jerusalem has already been annexed by Israel.  
Any agreement involving returning annexed lands requires a vote of the Israeli public, 
which makes this even more complicated.  Also included is the issue of the status of the 
Old City and the Temple Mount, also known to Muslims as Haram esh sheriff, and how 
sovereignty over each religion’s holy sites would be divided.   
These four major areas of dispute are actually the most basic parts of any future 
agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but they are also the most complex 
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and hardest to solve.  All of these issues must be solved for any agreement to result in a 
successful and lasting final status. (Pressman, Enderlin, Rabinovich) 
History of negotiations: 
 Starting in 1993, with the signing of Oslo 1, the Palestinians and the Israelis 
reached the most basic principle needed to begin the process of negotiations by 
recognizing each other and formally opening the channels for negotiations.  This was the 
start of the formal “peace process” in which the Palestinians and the Israelis were able to 
come to multiple agreements through negotiations.  This process included equal status 
negotiations, even though other countries would help broker these agreements, (primarily 
the United States).  The process started out with the hope that there could be pure 
multilateral negotiations that would ultimately result in a lasting and final peace 
agreement. 
Immediately after Oslo 1 was signed, numerous other agreements were reached 
through negotiations involving the Israelis and the Palestinians.  These were “the 
Protocol on Economic Relation”, “The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area”, 
“Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities between Israel and 
the PLO” and the “The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (Oslo 
2).  These agreements all served as the initial steps in the Oslo peace process, and began 
transferring control of Palestinian Territories from the Israelis to the Palestinians, starting 
with Gaza and Jericho.  The Oslo agreements established a five year timeframe that 
would lead to the declaration of a permanent Palestinian State in May, 1999.  Even 
though 1994 would be an important year, there were also several Palestinian extremist 
terrorist attacks, including four deadly suicide bombings in Israel (Bickerton and 
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Klausener 281-283).  Despite these bombings, the peace process still continued amid 
demonstrations opposing it by extremists on both sides.  It was hoped that the peace 
process would reach a final status agreement though multilateral negotiations.  
 Following the assassination of the architect of the peace process, Israel Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu of the right wing Likud 
party, the peace process began to stutter and deteriorate.  For the first time in the history 
of the negotiations there would not be such open and willing negotiations from either 
side.  This foreshadowed the time period after the final collapse of the peace process 
through the opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel under the Western Wall of the Temple 
Mount along both the Jewish and Arab quarters.  The Arabs were both surprised by the 
excavation, because it had been done in secret, and appalled because the Israel had dug 
underneath Muslim holy sites.  Immediately, Arafat called for marches and protests 
against such a “big crime.”  As a result of the marches, 15 Israeli soldiers and 60 
Palestinians were killed. The Israeli public lost their faith in the ability of the Palestinian 
Authority to try to achieve peace. Both sides had taken a step in the wrong direction 
(Rabinovich, 99).  This gives a good example of Israel being forceful and acting on its 
own without consulting the Palestinians.  It is an example of a unilateral action from the 
time period of negotiations.  This small example implies Palestinian violence increases 
towards Israel when Israel tries to impose outcomes onto the Palestinian people. 
 Despite his party affiliation and platform, Netanyahu’s administration still signed 
two agreements with the Palestinians: “the Hebron Agreement” and the “Wye River 
Agreement.”  Both agreements were signed under the coercion of the United States.  
Netanyahu was defeated in the next election by Labor Party leader Ehud Barak, and the 
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next round of negotiations would be the famous failed Camp David Summit followed by 
the Taba peace talks in January 2001.  The second intifada started after the Camp David 
Summit and before Taba in September, 2000 and featured extensive Palestinian violence 
towards Israeli civilians and soldiers.  Following Taba, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime 
Minister of Israel and his first actions were to end all formal negotiations with the 
Palestinians due to the high levels of violence (Bickerton and Klausner 337-354).  Israel 
and the Palestinians had a “hybrid” relationship in which there were no formal 
negotiations, but both parties took certain actions towards a possible future agreement. 
 The reason for the collapse of the peace process is highly contentious and can be 
directly tied in with the failure of the Camp David Summit, which is considered to be Bill 
Clinton’s final attempt for a final status permanent agreement.  Regardless of its failures, 
the Camp David Summit did make important progress in the peace process by showing 
how much each side was willing to compromise acting as a prelude to the Clinton Plan 
and Taba Summit.  The Clinton Plan, which is described clearly in Dennis Ross’ The 
Missing Peace, identifies Bill Clinton’s guidelines for the creation of a Palestinian State.  
This was a major step in the process, because it actually laid out the final details to a 
permanent status agreement. However, Jeremy Pressman clearly points out a few of the 
problems.  Israel’s biggest concern was the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees.  
Pressman and others argue that in reality few Palestinians would actually want to return 
to Israel (Pressman).  However, this was the key issue for Israelis, and only 28.9% of the 
Israeli public support the refugee framework discussed at Taba, which would have Israel 
recognize the right of the Palestinians to return to Israel (Shamir and Shikaki).  
Pressman’s other main argument for why Camp David failed is that the withdrawal from 
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the West Bank was to be done in many stages which would have taken decades.  Barak’s 
offer at Camp David, it is said that, while he offered 91 percent of the West Bank, only 
77 percent was going to be initially given to the Palestinians.  Also, only one ninth of the 
land inside the West Bank annexed by Israel was to be exchanged for land inside Israel.  
Camp David also failed because of the failure to agree on sovereignty over Jerusalem 
(Pressman). Following Camp David, it seemed that talks in Taba, Egypt may save the 
peace process from the Intifada.  However, upon his election on February 6, 2001 Ariel 
Sharon immediately terminated all negotiations with the Palestinians until the violence 
ended (Bickerton and Klausner 343). After eight years of an effort at a negotiated peace 
process none of the four areas of dispute were solved, which shows why the process 
indeed failed. 
 During the “hybrid period” there were many shades of unilateralism.  Ariel 
Sharon’s plan of unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip was first introduced in 
2004 as a way of attempting to address Israel’s occupation of former Palestinian 
territories and prevent Palestinian violence.  However, separation goes back much 
further.  The first part of the disengagement came in 1995 when it was decided by the 
then ruling Labor Party to build a security barrier completely around the Gaza Strip.  In 
2003, Israel decided to start building a security barrier around the West Bank, not 
completely following the 1949 armistice lines.  This is a prime example of an action that 
Israel is imposing its own terms (the map of the fence) onto the Palestinian people.  Israel 
decided the route based on its examination of what is morally and ethically right and gave 
little input to the Palestinian people (Rabinovich 310-311).  The fence is thought by many 
to define what Israel would want the future border of the Palestinian State to be. 
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Sharon’s unilateral plan only included the evacuation of settlers and troops from 
the Gaza Strip.  According to David Makovsky, a unilateral action was taken by the 
Israelis in order to solve the problem through the easiest manner.  With intense violence 
happening from 2000-2004, the Israelis believed they could act alone and not be 
criticized by the rest of the world.  In the summer of 2005, the Israelis did withdraw from 
Gaza.  In March, 2006, following Ariel Sharon’s incapacitation, Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert announced his “Convergence Plan.”  Israel was to withdraw unilaterally from the 
West Bank in 2008 and thus impose a permanent agreement on the Palestinians.  
Makovsky argues that the United States would have acted as a mediator for the 
Palestinians, and while it might seem like unilateralism, it would actually have aspects of 
bilateralism (Makovsky- Olmert).  Following the wars in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon in 
the summer of 2006, Olmert’s “convergence plan” is no longer considered to be an 
option.   However, regardless of whether or not Israel chooses to withdraw from the West 
Bank, restart negotiations, or continue the status quo, Israel has thus already taken a 
major step in the peace process by permanently removing all settlers and military bases 
from the Gaza Strip.   
The withdrawal from Gaza can therefore be examined to show how it compares to 
the years of negotiations (1993-2001) and also to the immediate years before its 
implementation (2001-2005).  It must also be acknowledged that there are many other 
factors that could be other independent variables, changes in leadership of each party due 
to elections and also a change in the international balance.  Although these factors cannot 
be controlled for purposes of this paper, they must be acknowledged.  This includes the 
many changes in the international system since September 11, such as the war in Iraq and 
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primarily Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah.  Keeping in mind that these variables do 
change, it is still possible to attempt to examine the effects of the withdrawal on both 
Palestinian violence against Israel and on Palestinian public opinion of Israel. 
Different Answers to the Question: 
In no way can the long term or permanent effects of the Israeli policy change 
towards taking unilateral actions be examined in this paper.  It is far too soon to realize 
how this important action will impact Israeli Palestinian conflict when examining it in the 
future.  Therefore, we will try to ascertain the short term effects of the unilateral 
disengagement from the Gaza Strip on Palestinian violence against Israel.  Initially, it 
seems to be simple, that there are three possible options.  Violence could increase, 
decrease, or stay the same.  Palestinian violence against Israel is a complicated thing, 
because of the many ways that it can be defined.  In general it refers to acts of violence, 
including terrorism such as suicide bombings, shootings, stabbings, rocket and mortar 
attacks, and also violence against Israeli army base and soldiers.  Palestinian violence can 
therefore be sub-defined into different areas showing the particular group of people 
against which the violence was directed (e.g. soldiers or civilians) and where it occurred 
(e.g. if it was inside of Israel as it existed on June 4th, 1967, or land subsequently annexed 
by Israel, such as East Jerusalem). 
Some people believed that the level of Palestinian violence would decrease 
following Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.  The main argument for this theory is 
that the Israeli withdrawal would be seen as a sign of peace.  Even though the actions 
taken may be unilateral, it was still seen as adhering to the Roadmap designed by the 
Quartet.  Therefore, even though the Palestinians were not involved in this significant 
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action, it was still an important step in the peace process, because it showed the 
Palestinians that the Israelis were serious about peace.  Another argument for decreased 
Palestinian violence against Israel was that the withdrawal demonstrated incredible 
sacrifice by Israel.  Not only was the withdrawal extremely controversial, but many 
settlers had to be physically removed from their homes.  The pain was clear for everyone 
to see, and in order for any government to do such a thing to its own citizens, they must 
be willing to take such great sacrifice.  It was assumed that such sacrifice would be seen 
by the Palestinians as an optimistic sign that shows peace is possible and maybe it is time 
for arms to be laid down.  In no way would anyone argue that there would be no 
Palestinian violence following the withdrawal, merely that the level of violence would 
decrease.  A third argument is that following the second intifada it would be natural for 
the violence levels to decrease, just as it did following the first intifada.  Another reason 
could also be that some of the violence against Israel was carried out against Israeli 
settlers and soldiers inside the Gaza Strip and that following a withdrawal from Gaza, 
which is completely enclosed by a fence, there will naturally be less Palestinian violence 
against Israel.  This argument simply states that the disengagement takes many targets 
away from the Palestinians.  Regardless of the reason, some believed that the level of 
Palestinian violence should decrease following Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the 
Gaza Strip. 
It may be argued that the level of violence towards Israel would increase 
following the unilateral Gaza withdrawal.  This school of thought is based on two 
predominate theories.  First, the unilateralism displayed by the Israelis could weaken the 
Palestinian moderate’s (Fatah) control of the Palestinians and encourage Palestinian 
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civilians to become more radical.  This is the position that Saeb Erakat took immediately 
prior to the pullout when he spoke on July 25, 2005 during the presentation of a poll by 
Khalil Shikaki.  There are three major reasons why this might happen.  Since 
disengagement occurred right after a period of violence, Palestinians could believe the 
withdrawal resulted from the use of violence and not the negotiations of Fatah.  
Therefore, the moderate would be seen as ineffective.  Second, the withdrawal would be 
seen as a victory for armed resistance against Israel that occurred in the second intifada 
immediately prior to the announcement of disengagement. This would lead to increased 
support for extremist violent groups, which in turn increase violence towards Israel and 
damage the peace process.  Erakat even specifically said that unilateral disengagement “is 
burying the Palestinian peace camp alive.”  The third reason the moderate would be 
weakened is the Gaza withdrawal brought no change in the West Bank, demonstrating 
that Fatah was unable to take advantage of the political climate to achieve Palestinian 
statehood.  Another main argument for an increased level of violence following the 
withdrawal also stems from the great pain that was involved for the State of Israel.  It was 
evident to the entire world that the Israeli people were divided when it came to the issue 
of whether to leave Gaza.  There were many protests and sit-ins held on major Israeli 
roads, and it was clear to the world that a large percentage of Israelis did not support the 
unilateral withdrawal.  This lack of support may be seen as a sign of weakness in the 
Israeli government and show that many Israelis will never come to terms with the peace 
process.  This could increase the anger from Palestinians and possibly increase their 
support for violence against Israel.  
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The third possibility is that there would be no change in the level of Palestinian 
violence against Israel as a result of the withdrawal.  This school of thought would see 
the withdrawal as having no relation to the level of Palestinian violence and would argue 
that it would therefore have no effect on it.  Rather the withdrawal would affect future 
policy, not violence.  Another argument that the level of Palestinian violence would not 
change is that there would be an equal mixture of the main arguments laid above, 
resulting in no change.   
It seems clear that there is no obvious impact that the Gaza Strip unilateral 
disengagement immediately would have on the level of Palestinian violence against 
Israel.  Therefore, it is important to attempt to answer the question without bias toward 
any of these arguments.  Also, it is important to remember that there is still no definite 
way to prove that one of these arguments is true or will hold true in the end. 
Research Design: 
The first step to analyzing the effects of the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip is to look at the differences and similarities of several years from the peace 
process along with the past four years, 2003-2006, during which the unilateral process 
was conceived and implemented.  Although the withdrawal occurred in the summer of 
2005, it was informally announced in early 2004.  This paper will review seven polls 
conducted during the years 1994-2000.  These polls give an excellent distribution of 
thought through the peace process.   During this time control of the government was 
divided between Labor and Likud.  These years can show how the commonalities 
between the years that represent the highs and lows of the peace process can compare 
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with the Israeli policy change in the beginning of 2001.  Because there was very little 
change in 2001 and 2002 the last five polls look at the years 2003-2006. 
Thanks to polling from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 
(PSR), under the direction of Khalil Shikaki, it is possible to examine reliable public 
opinion polling of the Palestinian People and is known internationally for its polling 
work.  The Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS), which is now a part of the 
PSR, conducted all polls prior to May, 2000.  Although there is no consistent question 
asked in every poll, it is possible to analyze the answers to similar and intriguing 
questions asked throughout the different polls.  The attitudes of Palestinian civilians can 
be seen through these polls, which can perhaps lead to some generalized summaries of 
how the Palestinian people are reacting to current events.  The polls included only 
Palestinians living inside the Palestinian territories, and identify whether the respondent 
lived in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank.  These polls do not include Palestinians living 
in other countries or anywhere outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
I have chosen 12 polls done by PSR and CPRS. As previously mentioned, seven 
of the polls were conducted between 1993 and 2000.  I also selected one poll from each 
of the years being studies in the violence count (2003- 2006).  All four of these polls were 
conducted in December of the year being examined and thus give a good sample of the 
feelings and thoughts of the Palestinians at the culmination of the year.  There is also one 
additional poll from 2006. The polls that were conducted from 1993 through 2000 give a 
good retrospective on what the atmosphere was like among the Palestinian people from 
the start of the formal peace process all the way until it collapsed.   
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When examining public opinion polling regarding the Arab- Israeli conflict, it is 
important to remember that there can be the presence of certain biases.  According to 
“Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Two-Level Game”, by Jacob Shamir and Khalil 
Shakiki, there were several studies that showed Israelis were more likely to agree with a 
proposal that was submitted by Israel, than if the same proposal was submitted by the 
Arabs.  The converse was found for Palestinians.  For example, Israelis may be more 
likely to think unilateralism was a good idea because it was done completely by the 
Israeli Government, while they may not have actually agreed with the same plan if it was 
thought up by the Palestinians.  There is actually an example of this in PSR poll #37 
regarding the Wye River Memorandum, which was heavily encouraged on the 
Palestinians by the Americans.  Interestingly, 57.1% of Palestinians thought that the 
Israelis gained more from Wye then the Palestinians.  77.6% believed that the 
Palestinians would implement the agreement, while 72.8% did not think the Israelis 
would implement the Wye memorandum.  These numbers clearly show a lack of trust in 
the Israelis and the belief that the Israelis are being more decisive in the actual peace 
process.  This is an indication of why perhaps more Palestinians support the general 
peace process then they do this specific agreement.  These findings agree with the 
thoughts of Shamir and Shakiki in showing the general lack of trust from both sides 
toward the other and that there is bias in the answers. 
The next step after reviewing the public opinion polling is to fully understand 
how the events of each year and the timing may have impacted the results.  This analysis 
will help show how the unilateral withdrawal has affected the Palestinian public opinion 
towards Israel regarding several topics, including whether or not armed resistance should 
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be used to achieve a Palestinian State.  The results will then be used to examine the 
effects of the unilateral withdraw on violence.  The public opinion polling analysis is 
crucial, because the examination starts with the beginning of the formal peace process 
and therefore anything that happens regarding unilateralism can be more easily correlated 
because of the amount of data that is available. 
The second part of the data analysis is the formal evaluation of how the level of 
Palestinian violence against Israel changed in the years from immediately prior to and 
after the unilateral withdrawal.  In order to quantify Palestinian violence, several terms 
and definitions must be presented.  First and most importantly the level of violence here 
is measured through a “violence count.”  A violence count is defined as any attack by a 
Palestinian that resulted in the death of at least one Israeli, civilian or soldier.  For the 
purposes of this paper, a violence count can also be any suicide bombing, in which the 
bomber detonated himself or herself in a clear and purposeful manner trying to attack an 
Israeli target, which resulted in at least 10 Israeli injuries.  This number was chosen to 
ensure that large scale suicide bombings that did not kill any Israelis would still be 
included.  Using LexisNexis online research database, I ran a search through the New 
York Times looking for “Israel” in the headline and lead paragraph and the word “killed” 
in the full text.  This provided what seems to be a near accurate count of the violence 
counts for the years 2003 to 2006.  The most important part is that the definitions 
remained consistent throughout the counting of the attacks.  Regardless of whether it 
includes every single violence count that meets the above definition, it does provide a 
consistent count.  The violence counts were put into an excel spreadsheet that includes 
every single day for the four years.  The counts were also subdivided into five different 
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categories based on who they were directed against and where they took place.  The first 
category is violence against Israeli civilians inside of Israel’s pre-1967 borders (including 
land annexed afterwards by Israel, such as East Jerusalem).  The second is violence 
towards Israel civilians inside the West Bank and Gaza (this is violence against settlers).  
The third is violence against Israeli soldiers that was provoked by Israel.  This is defined 
as any violence count that can be attributed to the death of an Israeli soldier that was 
killed in an operation against Palestinians.  The fourth category is any violence that 
caused the unprovoked death of an Israeli soldier.  This would be any Israeli soldier death 
by a Palestinian attack that was not in the third category.   The fifth and final category is 
any violence count that can be attributed to kassam rocket fired from a Palestinian inside 
the West Bank or Gaza strip.  It should be clear that these all of these counts only include 
those carried out by Palestinians, which does not include Israeli Arabs or non-Palestinian 
terrorists attacking Israel, towards Israelis, which also does include Israeli-Arabs.  The 
count for the years 2003-2006 can then analyzed to show how in a post negotiation 
setting, the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza affected violence from the Palestinians 
towards Israel. 
Part Three: Presentation of Data 
The public opinion polling of Palestinians is a good way to measure the reaction 
of the Palestinian people to the policy strategies initiated by the Israeli government.  It is 
important to remember that there are many other independent variables that are 
responsible for the sentiments of the people in the polling.  This could range from which 
leaders and political parties are in power to the level of Israeli military involvement.  It is 
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therefore necessary to interpret the polling with an open mind, and some degree of 
skepticism. 
One of the most important independent variables that may contribute to the 
answers in the following public opinion polling is the current Israeli policy.  
Unfortunately many of the questions in the polling are not asked in the same way 
throughout the different polls.  This is why it is necessary to collect questions from many 
different polls spanning the 14 year period between 1993 and 2006.  All of the polling 
information that will be presented in this section can be found in Table 1.  Many of these 
questions that are categorized together for the purposes of this paper are not precisely the 
same.  For example, question grouping 1 is “do you support the agreement?”  This 
question refers to the agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis at the specific 
time, so naturally each question is worded differently, but at the same time they are 
measuring the general support for the specific agreements that have been introduced. 
Another major concern with the presentation of the data is that the questions 
asked in the CPRS polls mostly have the answer choices being “support,” “oppose, 
 or “don’t know/ no opinion.”  In the PSR polls, many, but not all, of the questions 
present the choices of “strongly support,” “support,” “oppose,” “strongly oppose,” or 
“don’t know/no opinion.”  In this paper, I have elected to aggregate “strongly support” 
and “support” into a single response for purposes of comparison with previous polls, and 
similarly for “oppose” and “strongly oppose.” 
The most fundamental issue that is trying to be resolved out of these questions is 
how Israeli policy changes have affected the peace process and levels of Palestinian 
violence against Israel.  Thanks to the polling we are able to look at data of both support 
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for the peace process and support for violent attacks against Israel.  This is complicated 
because sometimes the question is whether they supported attacks against Israeli targets 
in general and sometimes the question is specified against who they were targeting, such 
as settlers, soldiers or civilians in Israel.  These questions are of even greater use because 
they can further attempt to ascertain and identify the Palestinian sentiments about 
violence against different kinds of targets. 
The first poll being examined, CPRS Poll #1 conducted from September 10-11 
1993, entitled “The Palestinian-Israeli Agreement: Gaza-Jericho First”, looks at the 
Palestinian response to the first Oslo Accords, which is considered to be the first formal 
agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians and thus serves as an excellent start 
in the study of Palestinian public opinion during the peace process.  64.9% of Palestinian 
people surveyed “supported” the proposal and 44.9% thought that the agreement would 
eventually lead to a Palestinian State.  Although the majority of Palestinians thought the 
Agreement was a good thing, less then half of them thought it would actually lead to a 
Palestinian State.  In CPRS poll #20 reflecting the Oslo 2 peace agreement, conducted in 
October 1995, 72.1% of Palestinians “supported” the agreement, a 7.2% increase over 
Oslo.  This would turn out to be the highest Palestinian support any of the major 
agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, based on these surveys. 
The questions regarding specific agreements show a reaction to current policy 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians.  The Wye River Memorandum, which was 
accomplished under the auspices of the Netanyahu Likud government and was viewed to 
have been signed under American pressure, did not get as much support from the 
Palestinians.  This may be a result of thinking about the force used by the Netanyahu 
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government onto the Palestinians.  CPRS poll #37, which was conducted from November 
12-14, 1998, gives a clear representation of Palestinian sentiment towards the already 
enacted policies of the Netanyahu Likud government.  Interestingly, 58.6% of 
Palestinians “support” the agreement, while 35.3% “oppose” it.  This is a near 15% drop 
in support of the agreement compared with Oslo 2.  Wye was an important agreement 
though, because it actually further enforced the principles of Oslo 1 and 2.  In the Wye 
Memorandum, Netanyahu agreed to transfer lands to the PA, Palestinian prisoner 
releases, a larger Palestinian Police force and kept the May 4, 1999 deadline on the 
Permanent Status Agreement, only five months away from the signing of this 
Agreement..  
PSR Poll #10 was taken from December 4-9 2003.  The Poll focused on the 
recently released Geneva Accord and the Roadmap sponsored by the US, Russia, the 
European Community, and the UN, also known as the "Quartet.”  The Geneva Accord 
refers to a document that was sponsored by influential left wing Israelis and Palestinians 
who were not in power and thought they had found an agreement that would work in a 
time when all negotiations had been cut off.  However, only 25.4% of Palestinians 
surveyed “supported” the agreement, and only 4.7% “strongly supported” it.  Even 
though this agreement was not signed by either government, it still shows the negative 
feelings of the Palestinians during the time period to this particular agreement that tried to 
continue the peace process.   
In PSR poll #22, conducted from December 14-16, 2006, the Palestinian people 
were asked about their response to the “Roadmap.”  The “Roadmap” calls for a final 
settlement to be achieved in three years.  Surprisingly, even though this has never been 
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formally signed by either government, 49.1% of Palestinians were in “support” of the 
“Roadmap,” while 45.4% “oppose” it.  While, these numbers aren’t nearly as supportive 
as for the Oslo 2 agreement, they still illustrate a significant increase from the Geneva 
Accord, and may show that the Palestinians are starting to become more willing to 
support actual agreements. 
While Palestinian support of these agreements is necessary for a true and peaceful 
long term solution, in order for these agreements to be created there must also be general 
support for the peace process and general negotiations.  This is question category 2 in 
Table 1, which contains questions that ask if the people are either in support of 
negotiations or in support of the peace process.  These numbers may be even more 
important then the data regarding specific agreements, because of the general bias 
towards the author and general terms of a particular agreement, such as a possible 
timeframe. 
In CPRS poll #19, which was taken at the end of August and the beginning of 
September, 1995, 70.6% of Palestinians “supported” the current negotiations, while only 
18.8% were “opposed.”  These are very similar to the levels of support for Oslo 2, and 
show how at first the negotiations were directly tied into the agreements that resulted 
from them.  However, this would not be the case in any of the other polls.  In CPRS poll 
#22, taken in February and March of 1996, 78.3% of Palestinians “supported” the 
continuation of the then current peace process, while only16.4% thought it should be 
stopped.  Of the polls being examined that were taken before 2003, this is the highest 
percentage of Palestinians that “supported” the peace process and the lowest that 
“opposed” it.  While this came shortly after Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, since these are 
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only Palestinian respondents, Rabin’s immediate predecessor Shimon Peres seemed like 
an ideal candidate to continue the peace process as a chief architect of Oslo and would 
run his campaign on the continuation of the peace process.   
The 1996 election of Netanyahu and his stagnant policies paid a price on 
Palestinian support for the peace process.  In only four years evidenced in Table 1, 
Palestinian support dropped by a consistent margin in CPRS poll #37 and then again in 
CPRS poll #48, taken from March 30 to April 1, 2000, in which 71.1% of Palestinians 
support the current peace process, while 25.4% oppose it, which represents a significant 
drop in support and gain in opposition of the peace process.  This shows the continued 
weakening of Palestinian support for a negotiated peace process leading up to its ultimate 
crash later that year.  However, the general mood was still optimistic prior to the final 
collapse of the multilateral negotiation environment that existed from 1993 through the 
summer of 2000. 
In the post negotiation “hybrid” stage that has been occurring since 2001 
Palestinian support for return to the negotiation table has significantly increased.  As 
shown in Table 1, by the end of 2004 in PSR poll #14, conducted December 1-5, 2004, 
the Palestinians overwhelmingly “supported” an immediate return to the negotiation table 
by both sides.  Despite the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza being only 6 months away, it 
seems that the Palestinian people didn’t want the Israelis to be able to dictate the terms of 
any solution.  This may explain why 80.1% of Palestinians were then in favor of 
negotiations, a higher number that at any point during the actual peace process.  
However, this desire for negotiations would be short lived when at the end of 2005, the 
year the disengagement occurred, PSR poll #18 was conducted from December 6-8.  In 
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this poll, each Palestinian was asked if they supported the “Roadmap,” sponsored by the 
Quartet, only this time it was asked in context to negotiations.  Only 59.3% of 
Palestinians supported a return to the negotiating tables.  This indicates that immediately 
after the unilateral disengagement, the Palestinian people had less support for the peace 
process.  Again in 2006, in PSR poll #22, only 61.8% supported the possibility that 
Hamas negotiate with the Israelis, while 33.7% opposed it.  These are similar figures to 
2005 and may also be influenced by the armed conflict in Gaza in the summer of 2006.  
While these numbers still show a strong support for the peace process, they are 
significantly less then those numbers seen in 1995.  This may show that the Israeli policy 
change to unilateralism had negatively affected Palestinian support for negotiations. 
The most important question in terms of analyzing the level of Palestinian 
violence towards the Israelis is whether Palestinians support the attacks against Israel.  
Unfortunately as previous mentioned, the polls do not provide consistent questioning 
regarding this topic.  In question category #3, the question is phrased simply regarding 
any armed attack against Israel. 
In CPRS polls #37 and #48, and PSR poll #1, there is a consistent increase in 
support for Palestinian armed attacks against Israel.  In the CPRS polls the Palestinians 
are asked during the multilateral negotiation stage.  In 1998, after the Wye River 
Conference, more Palestinians opposed attacks against Israeli targets then supported 
them.  Over the next two years of stagnation and no implementation, the support for 
attacks increased slightly.  However, in PSR poll #1, taken just four months after CPRS 
#48, 51.6% of Palestinians supported attacks against Israel, while 42.7% opposed such 
attacks.  In less then two years there had been a 10% shift in the direction of support for 
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the attacks.  The second intifada started only a little more then one month after this poll 
was conducted.  A similar question was asked during the “hybrid” stage, in PSR poll #18.  
Only this time in the post withdrawal poll, the question was worded by asking if 
Palestinians supported attacks from Gaza against Israeli targets.  Nearly 35% of 
Palestinians “supported” such attacks, while more then 60% were “opposed.”  This is a 
dramatic change and may be a sign that Palestinians were less in favor of violence after 
disengagement.  However, the wording of this question draws special interest.  The 
question is whether Palestinians support “armed attacks from the Gaza Strip against 
Israeli targets.”  Therefore, it seems that Palestinians want to end attacks only from the 
Gaza Strip.  In fact, 8% more of Gazans oppose these type of attacks when compared 
with Palestinians in the West Bank. 
The other form of the question asks specifically against whom the Palestinians 
support armed attacks.  In question 4, the question addresses violence against settlers in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in question 5 against soldiers, and in question 6 
against Israeli civilians inside of Israel.  Each of these categories is separate and 
represents a different target.  However, the settler and soldier may be seen as similar by 
the Palestinian respondent as they both operate in territory that Palestinians consider their 
land and therefore will be more likely to support attacks against them.  These questions 
are asked in CPRS poll #19 and PSR polls #10, #14, and #20.  As can be seen in Table 1, 
the settler and army target numbers are indeed similar and within a couple of percentage 
points, which only helps further demonstrate the trends seen in these polls. 
CPRS poll #19 represents for this question the general response during the 
highlight of the multilateral negotiation stages.  The support for attacks against Israeli 
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civilians was 18.3%, a much smaller percentage than the 67.6% that supported attacks 
against soldiers.  This is a near 50% difference and shows how greatly different 
Palestinians feelings were towards attacks against civilians versus attacks against Israeli 
soldiers.  These numbers jump up by a large margin in the 2003 and 2004 polls.  In 2003, 
over 85% of Palestinians support attacks against soldiers and settlers, while 47.5% 
support attacks against civilians.  This is a large difference from 1995 and it shows the 
large difference in Palestinian mentality between the different times.  In 2004, the 
amounts were very similar to 2003, with only a slight decrease in support for attacks 
against settlers and soldiers, and a slight increase in support for attacks against civilians.  
However, these changes are not significantly different.  Regardless, these polls show a 
clear difference in attitude towards specific targets between the multilateral negotiation 
stage and the hybrid stage of the 2000’s.  In PSR poll #20, taken in June, 2006, only 42% 
of Palestinians “opposed” violence towards civilians, which shows a further likelihood of 
the hybrid system increasing the Palestinian support for violence against citizens. 
Unexpectedly, this number is far different from the support for attacks from Gaza 
at the end of 2005.  Even more surprising is that in the June, 2006 poll, 69.1% of people 
in the Gaza Strip “supported” attacks against Israeli civilians compared with only 48.5% 
of people in the West Bank.  This further shows that people inside of Gaza who had felt 
the impact of the withdrawal the greatest actually support violence even more post-
disengagement. 
Two significant questions were asked only in the “hybrid” polls, which may help 
explain some of the results seen in the second part of the research that looks to analyze 
the specific impact of the Gaza withdrawal on Palestinian violence towards Israel.  The 
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first is question category #7, which is whether armed confrontation has helped Palestinian 
rights in a way that negotiations could not.  This is simply asking whether armed attacks 
are better for Palestinians then negotiations and the peace process.  This question was 
asked in each of the polls taken in the end of the years 2003-2006.  
In the 2003 and 2004 polls there is no real significant difference in these numbers, 
with approximately 64% of Palestinians believing that armed confrontation helped them 
in ways negotiations could not.  These numbers are not surprising as they help explain the 
recent level of violence.   In 2005, not shockingly after disengagement occurred, there 
was a 5% increase in belief that armed conflict helped the Palestinians more then 
negotiations.  This is directly correlated with the answer to question category #8 
concerning whether Israel’s unilateral withdrawal was a victory for armed resistance.  As 
can be seen in Table 1, these numbers are high and grow from 2004 to 2005, which 
shows over 82% of Palestinians believe that it was indeed a victory.  This explains why 
Palestinians who are finally seeing the end to the overt Israel occupation in Gaza believe 
that conflict has helped them more then negotiations.  This may be one of the leading 
factors that led to the election of Hamas in 2006 to a majority of the Palestinian 
Parliament.  However, by the end of 2006 there was a dramatic change to less then 50% 
of Palestinians that thought armed resistance has helped more then negotiations.  This is 
most likely because the Palestinian situation has not improved inside of the Gaza Strip 
since the evacuation of settlers and the Israeli military presence.  Also in 2006 Israel 
conducted several military operations in Gaza, especially in the summer and fall.  These 
polls suggest certain trends in the Palestinian perspective to the different types of policy 
conducted by the Israelis.   
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The second part of the research, which is much simpler to present, represents a 
study of the actual level of violence.  The primary action to be looked at in this part is 
Israeli unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip that took place in August and 
September of 2005.  The data being presented in this subject is collected and tabulated in 
Table 2. 
Before the actual presentation of the data it must be remembered that this was 
collected using the definitions that were described in the research design collection. 
These statistics do not include every act of violence that meets my definition.  Rather this 
research includes every act of violence under my definition that was run through the 
search previously mentioned.  The New York Times occasionally might not include an 
act of violence that could meet my definition.  However, since this research was collected 
in a consistent manner, it is hoped that the results demonstrate the appropriate trends that 
occurred in the region, even if it does not include every single attack. 
The first and perhaps most surprising observation is how dramatically violence 
has decreased from 2003 to 2006 (see Table 2).  The violent attack totals in 2006 are less 
than 20% of those in 2003.  There is also a relatively consistent decline in total attacks in 
every year, with it falling first by 30, then 14, and finally by 9 to 12 in 2006.  This shows 
a clear decline in Palestinian violence towards Israel under the definitions of this research 
project.  The 64 attacks in 2003 represent nearly half of the total attacks found.  Of those 
attacks, 43 took place in the first six months of 2003.  This shows that most of the attacks 
happened in the very beginning of this time period.  However, every other year the 
attacks are distributed relatively evenly during the year.  The data is using small numbers, 
with the last year standing out in particular, which may show that this is not statistically 
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significant.  However, it apparently shows a decrease in Palestinian violence towards 
Israel.  The question is than inherently if this has anything to do with Israeli policy.  
Following the disengagement from the Gaza Strip by the Israelis, there have been 
only 20 total attacks, according to the definitions being used.  This is an outstanding 
figure, because there was a total of 131 attacks during the four year time period.  These 
numbers are misleading though; because of the 21 attacks in 2005 there were 8 after the 
Gaza withdrawal, which only accounts for four months of the year.  The distribution is 
equally weighted over the 12 months of 2006. This shows that immediately following the 
disengagement, there was still a lot of violence towards Israeli targets.  The violence only 
fades in 2006 with consistent numbers throughout that year.  The gradual significant 
decline in all violence over the four year period indicates that perhaps the disengagement 
did not play as large of a role in the decrease of Palestinian violence. 
I have categorized violence by the type of victim that was targeted.  These five 
categories can help give a better idea of what kind of attacks these were and possibly give 
some sort of motivation.  This can also help this data tie into the public opinion polling 
section.  The first category is attacks against civilians inside Israel.  This refers to most of 
the attacks that we would consider to be traditional terrorism, such as suicide bombings 
of public buses, restaurants, and other places inside of Israeli annexed territory.  These 
numbers consistently decrease along with the total attacks, but they decrease at a more 
rapid rate.  The percentage of these kinds of attacks on civilians inside Israel also 
decreases for each of the four years.   This is significant and shows that these traditional 
forms of terrorist attacks that were so prevalent in the beginning of the second intifada no 
longer seem to play as big a role.  There were no such attacks during the last eight 
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months of 2006, the longest stretch by far in this study, compared to 2003, which saw 
only one month without an attack against civilians in Israel. 
The second and third categories are attacks against soldiers, whether provoked 
during an Israeli raid or unprovoked at a checkpoint, military base, or normal patrol.  
There is no clear trend among attacks towards soldiers over the years, except that the 
percentage increases in unprovoked attacks from 2003 to 2004 and then decrease to the 
2003 numbers in 2005.  From disengagement until the start of the war inside the Gaza 
Strip through the capture of Giliad Shalit in late June, 2006 there were only 3 attacks that 
resulted in the deaths of Israeli soldiers.  In fact until that operation there were only 4 
total attacks against soldiers since disengagement.  This shows the general lack of 
successful operations against Israel soldiers.  This may be the result of the difficulty to 
kill soldiers in recent times, after all Israel waged a war inside of Gaza this summer and 
there were few Israeli soldiers that died because of the way in which the war was 
engaged.  Following the withdrawal from Gaza, there were clearly fewer soldiers to 
attack, as had been removed from the Gaza Strip. 
The fourth category represents attacks against Israeli civilians living in the West 
Bank or Gaza Strip.  These numbers were relatively constant in 2003 and 2004, but 
increased in 2005 and 2006 in their percent of total attacks, especially before and after 
disengagement in 2005.  This is even more interesting, because after disengagement, 
these attacks could only be against settlers living inside of the West Bank, since none 
were left inside the Gaza Strip.  This may indicate that, if the Gaza withdrawal was 
viewed as the result of violence, the same strategy of attacking settlers might also force a 
withdrawal from the West Bank. 
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The fifth and last category is attacks that caused Israeli deaths by rocket or mortar 
fire.  Unfortunately there is no way of quantifying the increasing rocket fire.  Following 
the Gaza Disengagement there was a large increase in these attacks from the Gaza Strip.  
However, since very few cause damage or death it is very hard to put them into this data.  
However, it is still seen how they have played a larger role in Israeli violence deaths in 
recent years.  This is one of the biggest problems facing Israel today, as after the 
withdrawal, there is no military presence to stop rockets from being fired from Gaza. 
Throughout the summer of 2006 this remained a very large problem that Israel is still 
trying to address.  However, these attacks have remained since the withdrawal.  What 
cannot be accurately identified through my research is the dramatic increase in rocket 
attacks against Israel since the withdrawal.  According to the Israel Foreign Ministry, in 
2006 there were 861 “rockets” fired at Israel, compared with 222 in 2005.  However, 
these numbers do not include “mortar” attacks, which the Foreign Ministry says have 
declined from 1213 in 2004 to only 57 in 2006 (The nature and extent of Palestinian 
terrorism, 2006).  Rocket attacks, which use Kassam rockets, have increased significantly 
since disengagement and became the Palestinians main striking force against Israeli 
civilians in 2006.  However, the rocket and mortar attacks have extremely low success 
rates as can be seen through the violence count attributed to them through this research 
design.  Since these attacks have very low casualty rates, they are may not be a major 
player in the situation.  Regardless of this, the fact that they are being launched in such 
high quantities is a major concern for the Israeli public, especially those citizens who live 
within range of the current rockets.  Because the Kassam rockets can be launched from 
inside of the Gaza Strip with little forewarning and it is hard to catch the perpetrators, any 
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increase in such attacks must be taken seriously by the Israelis.  Due to their ease and 
simplicity, these attacks, although less lethal can play a major role in Palestinian violence 
against Israel.  Therefore, they still must be given the same attention as the other types of 
attacks used by Palestinians against Israel. 
The Israel Foreign Ministry data, which is the only reliable figures on violent 
attacks against Israel, agrees with the findings of this section.  In fact, the trends that they 
present for Israeli casualties are incredibly similar to the findings of this paper (The 
nature and extent of Palestinian terrorism, 2006). This shows that although this study may 
not have included every attack, it was consistent in finding the correct trends in data.  
Therefore, this data provides a legitimate count of successful Palestinian attacks against 
Israelis from 2003-2006. 
 
Part 4: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 The first part of the research showed that the Palestinian “support” for attacks 
against Israel has increased since the beginning of the formal Peace Process.  From the 
polling it also seems that the unilateral disengagement was viewed as a victory for 
Palestinian violence.  With this data it is expected that Palestinian violence towards 
Israelis would increase or at least stay at the same level between the years 2003- 2006.  
However, from the second part of the research it is evident that the exact opposite 
happened, which agrees with the higher support for the peace process (but still low in 
comparison to surveys during the peace process) at the end of 2005 and 2006.  Palestinian 
civilian support for attacks against Israel increases while the actual amount of attacks and 
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level of violence towards Israel decreased.  These are two conflicting statements, which 
may have several explanations. 
 The first and foremost conclusion from this project is that indeed the Israeli policy 
change to the unilateral withdrawal used in the summer of 2005 had the effect of 
increasing Palestinian support for violence against Israel.  This is evident through 
multiple polls.  First, compared to the era of negotiations in the mid 90’s the support level 
throughout the hybrid era of the 2000’s was much higher.  The key polls though actually 
show that through the end of 2005 there was a strong feeling that the withdrawal was a 
victory for armed resistance and accomplished more than negotiations could.  This makes 
perfect sense when one takes a step back to examine the situation.  Despite all of the 
negotiations throughout the 1990’s the only act that ever came about resulting in 
significant Israeli troop and settler withdrawals from territory claimed by the Palestinians, 
was indeed Israel’s unilateral withdrawal.  This disengagement came with no help from 
the Palestinian negotiators.  Therefore, the only explanation to the Palestinians, who 
viewed this as a good thing, was that it was brought about through violence and thus was 
a victory.   
 The Palestinians believed they could achieve further victories by increasing or 
maintaining their level of violence against Israelis.  The eventual disengagement from the 
West Bank and the formation of the Palestinian State were after all a big part of Olmert’s 
Convergence plan.  However, there is no formal evidence here that violence actually 
increased against Israelis.  In fact, the level of violence actually decreased and 2006 saw 
the least number of attacks that resulted in Israeli deaths in the past four years. 
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 There are several reasons why the support for violent attacks has increased, while 
the actual attacks themselves have decreased.  The first reason that should be given the 
most attention is that the Palestinians are not able to attack as many Israeli targets as 
before.  It should be remembered that this research is only looking at attacks that resulted 
in the death of an Israeli.  Therefore, we are only looking at attacks that accomplished 
their goal and in no way shows how many attacks were attempted and foiled.  The only 
credible source for this information comes from the Israel Ministry of Foreign affairs.  
Their releases say that, in 2005 15 suicide bombing attacks were prevented, compared to 
71 that were prevented in 2006.  These are both lower then the 184 and 119 suicide 
attacks foiled in 2003 and 2004 respectively; however, they show that there was a sharp 
increase in attempts in 2006 post Gaza disengagement (The nature and extent of 
Palestinian Terrorism, 2006).  This still does not fully explain why support for attacks 
was high even before disengagement.   
 One of the biggest reasons why Palestinian attacks have decreased is that they are 
harder to carry out because of the new West Bank security barrier.  This security barrier, 
which is composed of both fence and concrete sections, was approved by the Israel 
government on July 31, 2001.  Since that date the fence has been slowly constructed with 
many of the original routes altered to adhere to Israeli Supreme Court decisions and 
humanitarian issues.   The route was last altered on April 30, 2006 to include fewer 
Palestinians and less of the West Bank on the Israeli side of the fence. (Israel’s Security 
Fence).  Many people believed that the barrier would be a key to the final border in 
Olmert’s Convergence plan.  The security barrier is still under construction to this date 
with many unfinished areas, and large areas of the barrier are still not completed.  
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According to B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, only 58.04% of the 
barrier’s April 30th plan has been completed.  Regardless of how much of the 703 
kilometer proposed barrier has actually been completed, the most important security sites 
were finished around 2003 (Separation Barrier).  Therefore, the barrier has made it 
physically harder for the Palestinians to carry out attacks against Israelis and serves as a 
successful defense.  
The other major physical reason for fewer attacks is that the Gaza withdrawal has 
given Palestinian terrorists significantly fewer targets.  Through the disengagement, Israel 
removed both settlers and soldiers from the Gaza Strip.  This has not only removed 
targets from Palestinian violence but it has enclosed over a million Palestinians within the 
Gaza Strip, which is completely surrounded by a security barrier.  This means that all of 
the terrorists from the Gaza Strip have been completely cut off from participating in 
violence outside of mortar and rocket attacks.  This has reduced the number of 
Palestinian attacks against Israelis and severely limited their ability to launch more.  
Therefore, regardless of how much the Palestinians want to attack Israel they just simply 
do not have the same capacity that they once did, and their targets are more difficult to 
reach. 
 The second major reason why the Palestinians support more violence and yet have 
had fewer successful attacks is due to the belief that the disengagement was due to the 
victory of armed resistance.  Saeb Erakat’s words rang true in February, 2006, when the 
Palestinian Parliamentary elections resulted in the election of Hamas, a militant terrorist 
as well as humanitarian organization, to a majority and control of the PA.  This was the 
first time since the start of the peace process that Fatah, the moderate party of Yasser 
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Arafat, was not in control of the government.  Hamas has had to legitimize in order to 
successfully run the PA.  Their election has brought frequent clashes in the Palestinian 
territories, especially in the Gaza Strip, between different Palestinian factions.  In essence 
a civil war has broken out among the Palestinians since their election. 
 The election of Hamas may also explain why violent attacks have decreased 
towards Israeli targets.  The first reason is that the election of Hamas, instead of 
exacerbating their extremism, has actually made them more moderate.  With having to 
worry about the daily governance of the Palestinian people, Hamas no longer has the 
same ability to launch terrorist attacks against Israel.  Several ceasefires have been 
implemented between the Palestinians and the Israelis throughout 2006, in order to try to 
calm the region.  Therefore, the election of Hamas, rather then furthering the Palestinians 
hatred against Israel may have encouraged Hamas closer to becoming a legitimate partner 
in a future peace process, although this currently seems more unlikely.  However, they 
still at times encourage attacks against Israel following Israeli attacks on Palestinians, 
like those seen in mid April, 2007 that left nine Palestinians dead. (CNN) 
The second major reason for why the election of Hamas may have led to fewer 
attacks against Israelis is that the recent attacks by Palestinians against other Palestinians 
may mean that some Palestinians extremists have at least temporarily turned their 
attention away from the Israelis and against their own people.  Thus, Hamas’ attention 
has perhaps shifted to stopping the fighting inside the Palestinian territories or perhaps to 
even fighting against Fatah, by using their political control and police force to either stop 
the fighting or to try to help their own militants succeed. 
 
Sudow 39
Perhaps the most interesting and obvious counterexample to the decrease 
Palestinian violence towards Israel is that an entire war was fought this summer inside the 
Gaza Strip between the Palestinians and the Israelis.  On June 25, 2006 Palestinian 
terrorists attacked an Israeli army base killing two IDF soldiers and capturing Giliad 
Shalit a corporal in the IDF.  This was the first kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by 
Palestinian terrorists since 1994 and is considered by Israel to be the worst type of attack 
that can happen.  Israel’s response came three days later with the launch of Operation 
Summer Rains.  The attacks and raids inside the Gaza Strip continued until November 26, 
2006.  However, despite high Palestinian casualties, this operation resulted in very few 
Israeli army deaths.  This explains why the violence count in this thesis did not increase 
for this war that was fought with the Palestinians.  Unlike in Lebanon, Israel was very 
familiar with the territory in the Gaza Strip and could fight the war on its own terms 
without worrying about international pressure. 
In recent years, Israel has experienced fewer deaths as the result of Palestinian 
violence.   Because the violence resulting in Israeli deaths continues to decrease it can be 
concluded that the change in policy to unilateralism did not increase Palestinian violence 
towards Israel, regardless of increase Palestinian “support” for violence.  In my opinion 
this means that Israel recognized its ability to take the situation completely in its own 
hands and not see perceive it would experience any repercussions.  Even though Olmert’s 
initial convergence plan calling for a unilateral withdrawal from vast amounts of the 
West Bank has been discarded, there have been little repercussions because of the 
withdrawal from Gaza.  Even though the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was seen 
by the majority of Palestinians as a victory for armed resistance, which may have resulted 
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in the election of Hamas, it has made Israelis safer in one sense, while also deepening 
Palestinian Anger.  During the period of negotiations in the mid 1990’s the Palestinians 
still engaged in violence, and yet there was no success in the peace process.  
Unilateralism has given Israel very little incentive to negotiate with the Palestinians on a 
future deal.  In fact, while the Palestinians continue to fight among themselves and try to 
control their own people it seems that Israel has been happy to sit on the sidelines and 
worry about more pressing issues such as the Second Lebanon War fought this past 
summer. 
Things I would change if I did it again: 
 While I am satisfied with the results of this thesis and they appear to be near 
correct when crosschecked with Israel’s Foreign Ministry data, there are several aspects I 
would change if I could do it again and had more time to invest in this project.  The first 
issue and probably the one I had the biggest problems with was the actual violence count. 
The New York Times, although reliable, does not include every single attack that 
happened in Israel.  I feel this data was consistent in what was not included, but I felt that 
it was leaving out a few attacks each year that would have fit under my definition.  The 
other major problem with the violence count is that it only looked at attacks that resulted 
in Israeli deaths.  If more time was given, a count could have been developed with stricter 
definitions that would have given a much higher count.  However, just to get the count 
included here resulted in reading through thousands of New York Times articles.  I would 
also want to get better data on Kassam rockets.  Outside of the rare estimate from the 
Israeli government I could not find any kind of way to count these attacks since such 
attacks are only sporadically reported on in America or even the online version of the 
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Israeli newspapers. This Kassam rocket count would have been helpful in comparing 
types of attacks before and after disengagement. 
 The timeline for the project is also something I would have changed.  Looking 
back at the project it would have been helpful to run a violence count from 1991-2006 
looking at every Israeli policy shift.  Perhaps in a bigger project with much more time 
invested these results would yield better comparison for the comparison of unilateral 
policy versus negotiations.  However, I still agree with my decision to start the count in 
2003 in order to achieve a count that would compare the time immediately before and 
after the withdrawal was even introduced. 
Policy Recommendations and Conclusions: 
 In doing research for this project it crossed my mind that nearly every single 
Middle East expert agrees that trust is the most important factor that must be present 
before any kind of solution can even be discussed.  The Palestinians and Israelis must 
fully trust each other.  It has been almost seven years since there was any serious attempt 
toward negotiation and it doesn’t look promising that negotiations will occur come any 
time soon.  It is my opinion that acting outside of negotiations only exacerbated the 
inclination of both sides to avoid further negotiations.  The results from the polling are 
clear that armed resistance led Palestinians to believe they attained more results than 
negotiations could have.  Even though these numbers are dropping, they still constitute a 
majority of Palestinian opinion.  On the Israeli side, there have been little repercussions 
since the end of the second intifada without negotiations during this time period.  It seems 
that they have little incentive to return to the table.  This mechanism must be reversed, 
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because as the polling shows, there is less support for violence during times of successful 
negotiations. 
 The further Israel and the Palestinians are removed from negotiations, the harder 
it will be to return.  Right now they must be brought together and work things out in a 
well conducted process.  They must each learn to trust each other, which was a key 
failing of the Oslo peace process.  In Oslo, deadlines were set too early and did not take 
into account the likelihood of change in leadership and different political atmospheres.  It 
also didn’t specify what should happen if the deadlines were not met, meaning the 
agreements were all or nothing.  In any new peace process, the Israelis and the 
Palestinians must sit down and talk to each other about their concerns and not just walk 
away when something doesn’t go their way.  
 Trust is the key word.  The burden lies on both sides to prove to the other that 
they can be trusted.  The Palestinians must show they will not sponsor terrorism and stop 
all violence towards Israelis, while at the same time being able to control their own 
people.  Israel must show the Palestinians that as long as the Palestinians are trying to do 
their part to stop terrorism then they will not reply after every attack by an extremist with 
its full arsenal and also give Palestinians more rights.  At the same time all prisoners that 
are being held unfairly must be released, including Giliad Shalit and hundreds of 
Palestinians in Israeli jails.  These are tough actions to accomplish, but it is my opinion 
that they must be met first before any deadlines or solutions are negotiated.  The 
Palestinians and Israelis must learn that they are permanent neighbors and that not one 
people is going to completely win this conflict.  In simple words, they are stuck next to 
each other so they might as well play nice. 
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 Slowly, once trust between the two sides is built and they are talking to each other 
at the negotiation table, only then can actions start being implemented.  They must realize 
that they are not reinventing the wheel; the framework for a solution is already close to 
being in place.  The progress made throughout the 1990’s in the different rounds of 
negotiations must not be forgotten, but rather utilized as the basis for a final solution to 
the conflict.  A Palestinian state should not be something that is rushed into, but rather 
slowly formed.  Ideas should be implemented, but the time should be taken to do them 
right.  The Palestinian moderate must be rebuilt and negotiations must be seen as 
accomplishing more then violence could ever do.  Once these factors come into place 
then solutions can start to happen.  This is not something that can happen in the next few 
years, but over the next few decades when mentalities can change.   
Table 1: 
  1 19 20 22 37 48 1 10 14 18 22 #20 
Question Answer: 1993 1995s 1995o 1996 1998 2000p 2000a 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006b 
Support Agreement: Strongly Support        2.6   4.7  
#1 Support 64.9  72.1  58.6   22.8   44.4  
 Oppose 27.9  17.5  35.3   39.3   35  
 Strongly Oppose        21.3   10.4  
 
No Opinion/ don't 
know 6.6  10.4  6.1   14   5.4  
              
Support Peace Process Strongly Support         23.5 5.5 22.7  
#2 Support  70.60  78.3 75.2 71.1   56.6 54.3 39.1  
 Oppose  18.8  16.4 21.2 25.4   15.4 28 24.6  
 Strongly Oppose         2.7 7.8 9.1  
 No Opinion/ don't know 10.6  5.3 3.7 3.5   1.8 4.4 4.6  
              
Support Armed Attacks against Israel Yes    21.1 41.2 44 51.6   6.5   
#3 No     70.1 53.1 49.2 42.7   29.3   
 Not Sure    8.7 5.7 6.8 5.7   48.9   
           11.2   
           4.1   
Support Armed attacks against Settlers Strongly Support        52 44.5    
#4 Support  69.2      34.2 38.6    
 Oppose  24.3      9.9 12.4    
 Strongly Oppose        1.1 1.7    
 No Opinion/ don't know 6.5      2.7 2.8    
 
Sudow 44
Question Answer: 1993 1995s 1995o 1996 1998 2000p 2000a 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006b 
Soldiers in WB and Gaza: Strongly Support        55.5 44.4    
#5 Support  67.6      31.4 39.6    
 Oppose  23.7      9.2 11.4    
 Strongly Oppose        1.1 2    
 No Opinion/ don't know 8.7      2.7 2.7    
              
Civilians Strongly Support        25.1 22.5   24.7 
#6 Support  18.3      22.4 26.9   31.4 
 Oppose  73.9      41.8 40.9   36.2 
 Strongly Oppose        7.7 6.9   5.8 
 No Opinion/ don't know 7.8      2.9 2.8   2 
              
Did armed confrontation so far help Palestinian rights in a way that negotiations could not        
#7 Definitely Yes        28.6 23.4 24.5 15.7  
 Yes        35.2 40.5 43.9 33.7  
 No        26 28 25.5 39.9  
 Definitely No        7.1 5.2 3.2 8.7  
 No Opinion/ don't know       3.1 2.8 2.9 2  
              
Gaza Withdrawal victory for armed resistance?             
#8 Definitely Victory         40.4 45.9   
 I think that this is a Victory        34.9 36.6   
 I think that this is not a victory       17.2 13.9   
 Definitely not a victory         5.8 3.2   
 No Opinion/ Don’t know        1.7 0.5   
 
Table 2: 
Date total 
Israel 
Civilians 
Soldiers 
provoked 
Soldiers 
Unprovoked 
Total 
Soldiers 
WB/ Gaza 
Civilians Kassam
        
Total 2003 64 20 6 20 26 13 5
Percent year 140.63% 31.25% 9.38% 31.25% 40.63% 20.31% 7.81%
        
Total 2004 34 9 1 16 17 6 2
Percent year 150.00% 26.47% 2.94% 47.06% 50.00% 17.65% 5.88%
        
Total 2005 21 5 2 7 9 6 1
Percent year 142.86% 23.81% 9.52% 33.33% 42.86% 28.57% 4.76%
        
Total 2006 12 2 2 1 3 5 2
Percent year 125.00% 16.67% 16.67% 8.33% 25.00% 41.67% 16.67%
        
Total of all 
attacks 131 37 11 44 55 30 10
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